Why the West Clings to the Belief in a Power Transition in Russia

Photo source: https://www.ft.com

Ukraine is facing increasing difficulties in defending its stance on how the war with Russia should end and the necessary measures to weaken the Russian state. Figures like Vladimir Kara-Murza, Ilya Yashin, and the now-freed Mikhail Khodorkovsky carry significant symbolic weight, not just for Russia but for the collective West. In several Western countries, the belief in not dismantling the Russian state—driven by either faith or business interests—outweighs Ukraine’s ability to argue that only a defeated Russia can secure lasting peace in the region. Many Western political elites see the future of a "democratic Russia" as something that must have a recognizable face, and they believe that individuals like these are the ones who could lead such a transition. Unfortunately, this belief threatens to overshadow Ukraine’s calls for a complete Russian defeat as the only path to regional security.

Resurgence of Calls for Ukrainian-Russian Opposition Reconciliation

We should anticipate a new wave of appeals for reconciliation between Ukrainian civil society and Russian opposition figures in exile. Over the past year, these calls have diminished, but they are likely to resurface with greater intensity soon. The reasoning behind this will be that, while the military front remains active but stagnant in terms of breakthroughs, there may be diplomatic efforts to explore the possibility of a "ceasefire regime." Simultaneously, Western powers will push for preparations for a post-Putin era. For countries like Germany, it seems logical for Ukrainians to engage in dialogue with the Russian opposition abroad, who are seen as representatives of a future, more democratic Russia.

The Challenge of Maintaining Sanctions Amid Calls for Easing

It will become increasingly difficult to push for stronger sanctions against Russia when prominent symbols of Russian liberalism openly call for easing them, particularly for "ordinary Russians." The fine line between sanctioning the state and affecting its population remains blurry. Moreover, it is unclear how any significant change in Russian support for the war and its regime can be expected if the population feels no tangible consequences. The lack of protest in Russia is certainly no reason to relax sanctions, and yet explaining this to some of our Western partners seems futile, as they persist in the illusion that the Russian people are largely against the war.

Author: Anna Kuznetsova