Territorial Illusions: Why Core Clauses of Ukraine “Peace Plans” Remain Unworkable
Photo source: https://www.politico.eu/article/seven-weeks-until-donald-trump-russia-ukraine-war-advantage-peace-talks/
After the Berlin talks between U.S., European, and Ukrainian representatives, Vladimir Putin once again made clear that his demands are unchanged. Moscow continues to insist on full control over the Donbas, presenting it as an inevitable outcome rather than a political ultimatum. This framing ignores both the military reality — where advances remain slow and costly — and the strategic logic for Ukraine, for whom a voluntary withdrawal from Donetsk region would open the entire left bank of the country to future pressure. Any plan built on the assumption that Kyiv will “trade” territory for a pause in hostilities starts from a false premise.
The territorial component of the proposed settlements is the weakest link. Proposals circulating since November implicitly require Ukraine to abandon parts of Donetsk region in exchange for a freeze elsewhere, often dressed up as “demilitarization.” In Kremlin terms, however, demilitarization does not mean the absence of force: it implies replacing Ukrainian troops with Russian-controlled security structures. This would replicate the failed logic of the Minsk agreements, where nominal ceasefire zones became staging grounds for renewed aggression. From a risk-management perspective, Kyiv would be asked to give up defensible ground for promises that lack enforceable mechanisms.
Equally unrealistic are the military restrictions demanded of Ukraine. All known drafts include caps on the size of the Ukrainian armed forces, treating them as a bargaining chip rather than a core element of national survival. Yet numbers on paper are meaningless without funding. Maintaining even a reduced force requires tens of billions of dollars annually, excluding weapons and infrastructure. The unresolved question of whether frozen Russian assets can be used — or only serve as collateral for loans — leaves a structural financing gap that no peace plan currently addresses.
Security guarantees, the linchpin of any sustainable settlement, remain deliberately vague. References to protections “in the spirit of” NATO’s Article 5 stop short of binding commitments, while formal membership in NATO is explicitly ruled out in several drafts. Proposals involving multinational forces, air policing from neighboring states, or advisory missions all face the same obstacle: Moscow’s categorical rejection of any Western military presence tied to Ukraine. A guarantee that cannot be credibly enforced is not a guarantee; it is a political placeholder.
Finally, the broader strategic contradictions cannot be ignored. Some drafts attempt to bundle the war in Ukraine with global arms-control issues, reviving outdated frameworks that would benefit neither European security nor Ukrainian sovereignty. What emerges is a pattern: maximalist Russian demands presented as baseline conditions, and Western efforts focused on managing escalation rather than correcting incentives. In this configuration, “peace plans” risk becoming instruments for freezing instability — not resolving it — while shifting long-term security costs onto Ukraine and its partners without reducing the likelihood of renewed war.
Author: Anna Kuznetsova
